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 Did Religion Make the American Civil War Worse? 
By: Allen C. Guelzo 
August 23, 2015 
If there is one sober lesson Americans seem to be taking out of the bathos of the Civil War 
sesquicentennial, it’s the folly of a nation allowing itself to be dragged into the war in the first 
place. After all, from 1861 to 1865 the nation pledged itself to what amounted to a moral regime 
change, especially concerning race and slavery—only to realize that it had no practical plan for 
implementing it. No wonder that two of the most important books emerging from the 
Sesquicentennial years—by Harvard president Drew Faust, and Yale’s Harry Stout—questioned 
pretty frankly whether the appalling costs of the Civil War could be justified by its 
comparatively meager results. No wonder, either, that both of them were written in the shadow 
of the Iraq War, which was followed by another reconstruction that suffered from the same lack 
of planning. 
What kept the nation feeding an entire generation into the Civil War’s meat grinder, especially if 
the war’s endgame prospects were so unclear? The answer, in Stout’s version, was American 
religion. A war which began as a fairly colorless constitutional dispute over secession was 
transformed by a tidal wave of “millennial nationalism” into a crusade with no off switch. Faust 
flips the causal equation. If religion did not exactly drive Americans to war, then war drove 
Americans to religion as the justification for its lethally expensive costs. “The war’s staggering 
human cost demanded a new sense of national destiny,” wrote Faust, “one designed to ensure 
that lives had been sacrificed for appropriately lofty ends.” A nation guided by realpolitik knows 
when to cut its losses. A nation blinded by the moral gleam of a “fiery gospel writ in burnished 
rows of steel” and charmed by the eloquence of a president with an uncanny knack for making 
his assessment of political problems sound like the Sermon on the Mount, obeys no such 
limitations. 
There is not much questioning the cultural power of religion in America in the Civil War years. 
Americans at the midpoint of the 19th century were probably as thoroughly Christianized a 
people as they have ever been. Landscapes were dominated by church spires, and the most 
common sound in public spaces was the ringing of church bells. American churches jumped to 
exponential levels of growth. Between 1780 and 1820, Americans built 10,000 new churches; by 
1860, they quadrupled that number. Almost all of the 78 American colleges which were founded 
by 1840 were church-related, with clergymen serving on the boards and the faculties. Even a 
man of such modest religious visibility as Abraham Lincoln, who never belonged to a church and 
never professed more than a deistic concept of God, nevertheless felt compelled, during his run 
for Congress in 1846, to still the anxieties of a Christian electorate by protesting that “I have 
never denied the truth of the Scriptures; and I have never spoken with intentional disrespect of 
religion in general, or of any denomination of Christians in particular … I do not think I could 
myself, be brought to support a man for office, whom I knew to be an open enemy of, and 
scoffer at, religion.” 
If, in Jefferson’s words, the Constitution had erected a “wall of separation” between the church 
and the federal government, there was no corresponding wall between church and culture. 
Closed off from making policy, churches organized independent societies for Bible distribution, 
for alcoholism reform, for observance of the Sabbath, and for suppressing vice and immorality. 
And, they grew. By the time the French liberal Alexis de Tocqueville took his celebrated tour of 
the United States in the 1830s, he was amazed to find that while “in the United States religion” 
has no “influence on the laws or on the details of political opinions,” nevertheless, “it directs the 
mores” and through that “it works to regulate the state.” 
The question Tocqueville did not ask was whether American religion would always be content 
simply with cultural dominance, and might not seize an opportunity, if it presented itself, to 
assert a political role. And if ever there was a moment when it seemed possible that American 
religion might reassume a managing place in public politics, the Civil War was it. At the height 
of the war, delegations of concerned clergymen received high-profile audiences with the 
President; the National Reform Association moved an amendment to the Constitution to add 
formal recognition of Christianity to its preamble; the military chaplaincy was dramatically 
expanded as a major component of the U.S. armed forces; and “fully one-third of all soldiers in 
the field were praying men and members of some branch of the Christian Church,” and religious 
revivals in the armies converted between 5 and 10 percent of men in uniform. 
“Southerners must be made to feel that this was a real war, and that they were to be swept away by the 
hand of God, like the Jews of old.” 
Above all, it was a time when Christianity allied itself, in the most unambiguous and 
unconditional fashion, to the actual waging of a war. In 1775, American soldiers sang Yankee 
Doodle; in 1861, it was Glory, glory, hallelujah! As Stout argues, the Civil War “would require 
not only a war of troops and armaments … it would have to be augmented by moral and spiritual 
arguments that could steel millions of men to the bloody business of killing one another...” Stout 
concentrates on describing how Northerners, in particular, were bloated with this certainty. By 
“presenting the Union in absolutist moral terms,” Northerners gave themselves permission to 
wage a war of holy devastation. “Southerners must be made to feel that this was a real war,” 
explained Colonel James Montgomery, a one-time ally of John Brown, “and that they were to be 
swept away by the hand of God, like the Jews of old.” Or at least offered no alternative but 
unconditional surrender. “The Southern States,” declared Henry Ward Beecher shortly after 
Abraham Lincoln’s election to the presidency, “have organized society around a rotten core,—
slavery,” while the “north has organized society about a vital heart, —liberty.” Across that 
divide, “God is calling to the nations.” And he is telling the American nation in particular that, 
“compromise is a most pernicious sham.” 
But Southern preachers and theologians chimed in with fully as much fervor, in claiming that 
God was on their side. A writer for the Southern quarterly, DeBow’s Review, insisted that since 
“the institution of slavery accords with the injunctions and morality of the Bible,” the 
Confederate nation could therefore expect a divine blessing “in this great struggle.” The aged 
Episcopal bishop of Virginia, Richard Meade, gave Robert E. Lee his dying blessing: “You are 
engaged in a holy cause.” 
I see it now as I have never seen it before. You are at the head of a mighty army, to which 
millions look with untold anxiety and hope. You are a Christian soldier—God thus far owns and 
blesses you in your efforts for the cause of the South. Trust in God, Gen. Lee, with all your 
heart,” and placing his palsied hands on the General’s head, he added in a voice never to be 
forgotten by the bystanders, “you will never be overcome—you can never be overcome.” 
Holy causes that can never be overcome do not make provision for surrender. Unable to discount 
the burden of holiness, the South was doomed to resist beyond any point of reason, until its back 
had been broken on the war’s wheel.   
* * * 
These descriptions of the moral intoxication into which Americans drank themselves in 1861 fit 
the Civil War seamlessly into a larger pattern of American war making, since Americans love to 
imagine that when they fight, they fight for right, rather than for treacly political advantage. But 
so does everyone else, at least since the heyday of absolute monarchies. And I suspect that the 
prolonged blood-letting of the Civil War had much less to do with a collision of two causes, 
convinced in typical American fashion of their own purity, and more with pitilessly exposing the 
fissures in the absolutes of both sides. Eventually, the Civil War would render moral absolutism 
less, rather than more, believable, and with long and unhappy consequences for American 
religion. 
The preachers of 1861 might see church and state marching as to war, but it certainly did not 
look that way on the ground. That paragon of martial piety, the Confederate General “Stonewall” 
Jackson, had a very poor estimate of the influence of Southern religion in time of war. “I am 
afraid that our people are looking to the wrong source for help, and ascribing our successes to 
those whom they are not due,” Jackson complained, “If we fail to trust in God & to give him all 
the glory our cause is ruined. Give to our friends at home due warning on this subject.” 
So little provision had been made for chaplains’ services in the Army of Northern Virginia that 
fully half of the regiments in Jackson’s corps in the spring of 1863 were without one. In the 
Union Army, religion seemed to have just as meager a grip, despite the numbers of “praying 
men.” “It is hard, very hard for one to retain his religious sentiments and feelings in this Soldier 
life,” admitted one New Jersey surgeon. “Every thing seems to tend in a different direction. 
There seems to be no thought of God of their souls, etc. among the soldiers.” 
One Iowa soldier found himself enlisted in a company of German free thinkers, and was aghast 
to discover “they are the worst men I ever saw … They never think of God or that they have a 
Soul.” Or if soldiers did have thoughts about God, they were liable to be blasphemous ones. An 
Ohio cavalryman, disgusted by an “old cust of a Preacher” who claimed “God has fought our 
battles and won victorys,” concluded that the preacher must surely have “lied like Dixie.” If God 
had really done all that, “why is it not in the papers and why has he not been promoted.” 
For every Northern divine claiming God’s favor for the Union, and every Southern one claiming 
God’s favor for the Confederacy, there were far more who could not make up their minds what 
to say about slavery. And taken together, they created a popular perception that religion had 
nothing reliable or coherent to say about the greatest American issue of the 19th century. 
Charles Hodge, the greatest of America’s 19th-century theologians, had been shifting ground on 
slavery for 20 years. In the 1840s, Hodge deplored any suggestion that “slave-holding is itself a 
crime” as “an error fraught with evil consequences.” Ten years later, Hodge veered around to 
saying that slavery in the abstract might not be evil, but to practice slavery “in almost all” cases 
leads the slaveholder to practice evil. On that logic, Hodge concluded, “Emancipation is not only 
a duty, but it is unavoidable.” By 1864, Hodge was endorsing a Presbyterian General Assembly 
resolution that unequivocally branded slavery as “an evil and guilt.” With so much tacking 
before the political winds, how were the churches to give any worthwhile bearings to the people? 
Abraham Lincoln was another thinker who tacked before the winds. Lincoln was certain that “God wills 
this contest, and wills that it shall not end yet.” 
Abraham Lincoln was another thinker who tacked before the winds. Lincoln was certain that 
“God wills this contest, and wills that it shall not end yet.” But that was because Lincoln had 
been raised in a Calvinist household where every event, war or peace, was considered a 
predestined product of God’s will. What was more difficult for Lincoln to determine was what, 
exactly, God had willed this war for. In 1861, when his friend, Orville Hickman Browning, 
asserted, “Mr. Lincoln we can’t hope for the blessing of God on the efforts of our armies, until 
we strike a decisive blow at the institution of slavery,” Lincoln replied, “Browning, suppose God 
is against us in our view on the subject of slavery in this country, and our method of dealing with 
it.” 
This problem bothered Lincoln enough that he took it as the central theme of his second 
inaugural address. “Neither party expected for the war, the magnitude, or the duration, which it 
has already attained,” Lincoln observed. What is more, “Both read the same Bible, and pray to 
the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other.” Lincoln could not very easily declare 
his own side wrong about the Bible and God, but he could not, in similar fashion, nerve himself 
morally to throw all the opprobrium into the other balance. “It may seem strange that any men 
should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s 
faces,” he said, but he would allow himself no more than to find the Confederate argument 
“strange.” In the end, Lincoln opted for Calvinist agnosticism, which cloaked the will of God in 
mysterious ways, and left humanity with only the gentle reminder that “The Almighty has His 
own purposes.” There would be no ethical victory lap for Lincoln, no deus vult for a righteous 
and victorious Christian Union; instead, Lincoln enjoined the nation to behave “with malice 
toward none; with charity for all. 
* * * 
Instead of American religion corrupting the Civil War with absolutism, it is more possible to say 
that the Civil War corrupted American religion. An Iowa sergeant, shocked at the carnage at 
Shiloh, wondered, “Oh my God! Can there be anything in the future that compensates for this 
slaughter?” Religious discourse would become plagued more and more by incessant questioning, 
by decaying faith, and an increasing appeal to feeling and imagination over against confessional 
reason or evangelical conversion, and that did not provide much weaponry for an adventure into 
public forums. 
“Perhaps people always think so in their own day, but it seems to me there never was a time 
when all things have shaken loose from their foundations,” wrote one of the correspondents of 
the popular revivalist, Charles Grandison Finney, in 1864, “So many are sceptical, doubtful, so 
many good people are cutting loose from creeds & forms ... I am sometimes tempted to ask 
whether prayer can make any difference.” Far from feeling satisfied that the North had pursued a 
righteous crusade to its fulfillment, Finney himself was enraged that, after two years of war, “in 
no publick proclamation either north or south is our great national sin recognized.” 
William James, who ducked service in the war but who watched it wreck the lives of two of his 
brothers, concluded that the idealism which had led them to volunteer had been a destroying 
angel, and that it would be far better to regard ideas as instruments which help people adapt to 
their circumstances, rather than abstract truths which they allow to govern their actions. In his 
post-war career at Harvard, James formulated an entirely different way of understanding ideas, 
which he called pragmatism. 
Beliefs had to be judged by their consequences, James insisted, by whether they had “cash value 
in experiential terms” and could be converted into useful practical conduct. Giving abstractions 
like abolition and freedom some absolute status as truth made them into the lethal and 
uncompromising tyrants which decimated James’s generation. But without the status of truth, 
religion degenerated into therapy—which, from James’s perspective, was not necessarily a bad 
thing. 
“I fear the subjugation of the South will make an infidel of me. I cannot see how a just God can allow 
people who have battled so heroically for their rights to be overthrown.” 
For Southerners, the war laid an even heavier burden on religion. Edward Porter Alexander, who 
ended the war as a brigadier general in Robert E. Lee’s army, thought that religion had paralyzed 
Southerners more than energized them. “I think it was a serious incubus upon us that during the 
whole war our president & many of our generals really & actually believed that there was this 
mysterious Providence always hovering over the field & ready to interfere on one side or the 
other, & that prayers & piety might win its favor from day to day.” 
When, by 1864, defeat was looking the Confederacy in the eyes, the arms of the pious dropped 
nervelessly to their sides, and they concluded that God was deserting them, if not over slavery, 
then for Southern unbelief. “Can we believe in the justice of Providence,” lamented Josiah 
Gorgas, the Confederacy’s chief of ordnance, “or must we conclude we are after all wrong?” Or 
even worse, wailed one despairing Louisianan, “I fear the subjugation of the South will make an 
infidel of me. I cannot see how a just God can allow people who have battled so heroically for 
their rights to be overthrown.” 
However confident the Beechers and Bushnells had been at the beginning of the war that they 
could read God’s “righteous sentence by the dim and flaring lamps,” the war itself proved 
otherwise. If anything, American religion became one of the Civil War’s major cultural 
casualties. And contrary to Stout, the Civil War was not prolonged or made more intractable by 
religion, or at least not by religion alone. 
Total war, as Yale law professor James Whitman has recently written, was the result of politics, 
and particularly by the movement of governments in the 19th century away from monarchy and 
toward popular democracy. So long as government had been the private preserve of kings, then 
wars had been the sport of monarchs, and were fought as though they were princely trials by 
combat or a species of civil litigation. The only class of people likely to suffer severely by them 
was the nobility. The scope of war was limited simply because war was understood to be the 
prerogative of kings. 
But once democratic governments began to shoulder the monarchs aside—once governments 
became “of the people, by the people, for the people” and involved the entire people of a nation 
and not just a handful of aristocrats—war became the instrument of entire populations. No 
solitary monarch could now call them off; no gentlemen’s agreement could limit their scope. 
Wars became wars of nations against nations, waged for principles abstract enough to command 
everyone’s assent, and therefore all the more impossible to win short of the annihilation—not 
just the defeat—of an enemy. Not religion, but democracy made it necessary to invoke 
“millennial nationalism,” in order to recruit sufficient mass resources for new mass wars. 
Theories about justice in war or debates about the proportionality with which war could be 
waged would only serve as obstacles in the path to unconditional victory.  
From the Civil War onward, American Protestantism would be locked deeper and deeper into a 
state of cultural imprisonment, and in many cases, retreating to a world of private experience in 
which Christianity remained of little more significance to public life than stamp-collecting or 
bridge parties. Appeals to divine authority at the beginning of the Civil War fragmented in 
deadlock and contradiction, and ever since then, it has been difficult for deeply rooted religious 
conviction to assert a genuinely shaping influence over American public life. 
In exposing the shortcomings of religious absolutism, the Civil War made it impossible for 
religious absolutism to address problems in American life—especially economic and racial 
ones—where religious absolutism would in fact have done a very large measure of good. Some 
leaders, Martin Luther King prominent among them, have since invoked Biblical sanction for a 
political movement, but that has mostly been tolerated by the larger, sympathetic environment of 
secular liberalism as a harmless eccentricity which can go in one ear and out the other. “Never 
afterward,” wrote Alfred Kazin of the war, “would Americans North and South feel that they had 
been living Scripture.” I do not know that Americans have been the better for it. 
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